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Anchoring Justice:
The Constitutionality of the Local Law
Enforcement Enhancement Act in
United States v. Morrison's Shifting Seas
by
Anthony E. Varona and Kevin Layton
On May 15, 2000, the
Supreme Court announced its
decision in United States v.
Morrison,1 invalidating the federal
civil remedy for victims of gendermotivated violence enacted by
Congress as part of the Violence
Against Women Act (VAWA). 2
Christy
Brzonkala
originally
brought the case that led to the
Morrison decision. She alleged
that two fellow students raped her
at Virginia Polytechnic Institute in
September 1994. After a school
disciplinary proceeding failed to
discipline either of the two alleged
rapists, Brzonkala filed suit in
federal
court
against
the
individuals under the VAWA civil
remedy (and against the school under Title IX of the
Education Amendments Act of 1972). Both the District

Court4 and the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals 5 struck down VAWA's
civil remedy, and the United States
intervened
to
defend
the
constitutionality of the statute. A
five-to-four majority of the Supreme
Court found no constitutional
support in either the Commerce
Clause
or
the
Fourteenth
Amendment 6for VAWA's federal
civil remedy.
More than a disappointing
defeat for women's rights advocates,
the Morrison decision rang an alarm
through the civil rights community.
Not only does it bring into question
the validity of a large body of
existing statutes, it could also be a
bad harbinger for pending civil
rights legislation, in particular, the Local Law
Enforcement Enhancement Act (LLEEA). Like VAWA,
LLEEA would be a federal civil rights law that prohibits
bias-motivated incidents. LLEEA would expand existing
law to allow federal prosecution of hate crime committed
on the basis of sexual orientation, gender, and disability
status.
The predecessor bill of LLEEA faced misinformed
criticism and critique by opponents,7 but now the
Morrison decision provides traction for the entirely
different argument that Congress does not have authority
under the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth
Amendment to enact LLEEA. This article will show how
instead of tolling the demise of congressional hate crime
legislation such as LLEEA, Morrison actually reaffirms
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the legislation's constitutionality. First we will examine
LLEEA in detail, and then consider the shifting legal seas
created by the addition of the Morrison decision to
Supreme Court congressional authority jurisprudence.
Specifically, we will examine Morrison in light of the two
recent major cases, United States v. Lopez and Flores v.
City of Boerne, that seem to have marked the beginning of
these "shifting seas." To illuminate the legal shift, we
will examine past use of the Commerce Clause to enact
federal criminal and civil rights legislation and review the
Court's discussion of the limits of the Commerce Clause
in Morrison. We will explore the decision's potential
effect on enacting LLEEA and the multiple jurisdictional
elements written into LLEEA to address, in part, the
perceived
shortcomings
of
the
legislation's
constitutionality under the Commerce Clause in a postMorrison world. We will then turn to the Fourteenth
Amendment, review its past role in enacting similar
legislation, its treatment in Morrison, and the impact
Morrison should have on the decision to enact LLEEA.
We conclude with a judgment on the constitutionality of
LLEEA and an optimistic vision for its future enactment.
I.

THE LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
ENHANCEMENT ACT
LLEEA is only the latest in a series of federal
criminal statutes debated by Congress. While arguing that
criminal law is solely an area of state interest, the
Republican-controlled Congress has enacted at least
thirty-five laws since 19958 that create new federal crimes
or impose new federal criminal penalties for conduct that
is or may also be criminal under state law.
The 106 th Congress considered three separate pieces
of hate crime legislation in its waning days.9 Of the three,
LLEEA had the strongest support. Despite the strong
showing of support for this legislation in both the House
of Representatives' and the Senate," as part of their lastminute deliberations the Republican congressional
leadership removed LLEEA from the Department of2
Defense Authorization bill to which it had been attached.'
LLEEA is likely to be the starting point for hate
crimes legislation in the 10 7th Congress. Thus, a review
of LLEEA's provisions and the constitutional issues raised
by the Supreme Court in Morrison will better inform the
debate in Congress. As passed by the United States
Senate, LLEEA (like the Hate Crimes Prevention Act
introduced earlier in the 10 6th Congress) would expand
federal jurisdiction to reach serious, violent hate crimes.
Congress enacted the existing federal criminal civil rights
law, 18 U.S.C. § 245, as part of the Civil Rights Act of
1968 in response to inaction on the part of state and local
law authorities in protecting the federally protected civil
rights of victims of race- and religion-based hate violence.

The law requires two elements to be met before the
federal government may prosecute a hate crime. First, the
statute requires that the crime be committed because of
the victim's race, religion, national origin, or color.
Second, the perpetrator must have intended to prevent the
victim from exercising a "federally protected right" (such
as voting, serving on a jury, or attending a public school).
Although successful prosecutions have been brought
under this statute, 1 3 this dual requirement substantially
limits the potential for federal assistance in investigating
or prosecuting hate crimes, even when the crime is
particularly heinous.
Similarly, LLEEA is, in part, a response to inaction
on the part of state and local law enforcement in
protecting the civil rights of victims of gender-,
disability-, and sexual orientation-based hate crimes.
LLEEA defines a "hate crime" as a crime motivated
"because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion,
national origin, gender, sexual orientation,or disability"
of the victim.' 4 Under LLEEA's first provision, hate
crimes that result in bodily injury could be investigated
and prosecuted by the federal government, whether or not5
the victim was exercising a federally protected right.'
Under LLEEA's second provision, in a hate crime
motivated because of the victim's real or perceived
religion, national origin, sexual orientation, gender, or
disability, the federal government is required to prove a
nexus between the crime and interstate or foreign
commerce. 16
LLEEA would thus do two things. First, the statute
would provide new authority for federal officials to
investigate and prosecute cases in which the hate violence
occurs because of the victim's real or perceived sexual
orientation, gender, or disability. The current statute, 18
U.S.C. § 245, already provides authority for federal
prosecution of hate crimes committed because of the
victim's race, religion or national origin. Second, LLEEA
would not impose overly-restrictive requirements to
federal prosecution-such as showing that the victim was
attacked because he or she was engaged in a federallyprotected activity-and instead would require the hate
crime to be tied to interstate or foreign commerce in only
one of several ways.' 7 Thus LLEEA should increase the
potential for federal assistance in investigating or
prosecuting hate crimes.
II.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LLEEA
The Morrison decision is both timely and relevant as
Congress considers hate crime legislation.
Prior to
Morrison, Congress had smooth sailing when it came to
laws protecting civil rights. It enacted statutes on the calm
sea of court-approved constitutional authority under the
Commerce Clause and other parts of the Constitution.

STANFORD LAW & POLICY REVIEW

ANCHORING JUSTICE

One of its enactments was VAWA. Although VAWA's
civil remedy did not contain a jurisdictional element
requiring a link to interstate commerce, it did require the
plaintiff to prove that she (or he) was a victim of a crime
of violence and that the crime was committed because of
or on the basis of gender, and that the violence was due, at
least in part, to an animus based on the victim's gender. 18
The Court's invalidation of that civil remedy on both
Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment grounds
appears to call into question the authority of Congress to
enact LLEEA on either of those constitutional bases. This
decision joins two issues on which the Court has become
increasingly conservative--congressional authority to
enact legislation under the Commerce Clause and under
the Fourteenth Amendment. With respect to Commerce
Clause jurisprudence, the decision builds on the Court's
unexpected holding in United States v. Lopez, which
struck down a federal criminal statute punishing the
possession of a firearm within 1,000 feet of a school.19
The Morrison Court's discussion of the limits of the
Fourteenth Amendment, in turn, builds on the Court's
invalidation of provisions of the Religious Freedom
20
Restoration Act ("RFRA") in City of Boerne v. Flores.
These two streams of conservative legal precedent
converge in Morrison to become the shifting seas
Congress must navigate to enact LLEEA.

M. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
The Commerce Clause provides the constitutional
authority for federal jurisdiction over many modem-day
civil rights and criminal laws.21 When Congress enacted
legislation in the 1960s to protect individuals' civil rights
against violations by other private individuals, it acted
pursuant to its federal authority to regulate interstate
commerce. The Supreme Court affirmed Congress'
enactment of the civil rights legislation by upholding the
public accommodations provisions of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 in Heart of Atlanta
Motel v. United States?2 and
3
Katzenbach v. McClung.Y
In Heart of Atlanta Motel, a Georgia hotel owner
refused to accommodate black travelers, 24 and in
McClung, an Alabama restaurant owner refused to serve
26
5
black customers.2 The hotel served interstate travelers
and the restaurant, though it served primarily local
customers, bought a substantial number of food products
that had moved through interstate commerce. 27 As a
consequence, both businesses were subject to Congress'
constitutional authority to regulate interstate commerce
under the Commerce Clause.28
However, in 1995, the Supreme Court struck down a
federal criminal statute in United States v. Lopez
prohibiting possession of a gun within 1,000 feet of a
public, parochial, or private school. 29 Alfonso Lopez, Jr.
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was a high school senior at the time he was indicted by a
federal grand jury for violating the Gun-Free School
Zones Act of 1990 ("GFSZA") by knowingly possessing a
firearm in a school zone. Lopez challenged his indictment
at the District Court level, lost his challenge, and was tried
and convicted of violating the Act. Lopez appealed his
conviction, arguing that GFSZA was an unconstitutional
exercise of Congress' authority under the Commerce
Clause. The Fifth Circuit,30 and ultimately the Supreme
Court, agreed.
It was not the "criminal" nature of the possession of
a gun within 1,000 feet of a school, but the alleged lack of
a connection to commerce, that was fatal to the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990.31 In fact, the Morrison court
noted that the noneconomic nature of gun possession was
"central to [the] decision" in Lopez.32

A.

THE MORRISON DECISION
The legal uncertainty that arose around the
Commerce Clause in the wake of the Supreme Court's
decision in Lopez3 3 is even stronger now that Morrison
struck down another federal law as unconstitutional. 34 In
its Commerce Clause analysis, the Morrison majority used
unnecessarily broad language-the rhetorical equivalent
of using a cannon to kill a fly-to announce that "gendermotivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the
phrase, economic activity." 35 According to the majority,
"crimes of violence" are not economic activity and
congressional action attempting to provide a federal
remedy for what the Court characterized as "more purely
intrastate.., violent crime ''36 is an unconstitutional use of
Congress' Commerce Clause power.
Opponents of
LLEEA can be counted on to parrot this argument in
support of their own argument that Congress does not
have the authority to add gender, disability, or sexual
orientation to 18 U.S.C. § 245.
The Court dodged the obvious question of the
constitutionality of previous decisions (such as Heart of
Atlanta Motel and McClung) by stating simply that
violence is not economic activity while citing those
decisions as examples of the Court's cases upholding
federal statutes that substantially affected interstate
commerce. 37 Indeed, the Morrison majority went so far as
to assert that even Wickard v. Filburn8 dealt with
economic activity. 39 That interpretation, however, is not
shared by Justice Souter, who noted that:
The Wickard Court admitted that Filbum's
activity "may not be regarded as commerce"
but insisted that "it may still, whatever its
nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a
substantial economic effect on interstate
commerce . .. " The characterization of home
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wheat production as "commerce" or not is,
however, ultimately beside the point. For if
substantial effects on commerce are proper
subjects of concern under the Commerce
Clause, what difference should it make whether
the causes of those effects are themselves
commercial? The Court's answer is that it
makes a difference to federalism, and the
legitimacy of the Court's new judicially derived
federalism is the crux of our disagreement.4
Justice Souter's challenge to the relevance of the
causes of "substantial effects" on commerce deserves
more discussion. If the activity regulated by Congress has
a substantial effect on commerce, the cause or origin of
those effects should be irrelevant.
The Morrison
majority's mandatory inquiry into whether the source of
the "substantial effects" has a link to commerce weakens
Congress' ability to exercise its Commerce Clause power
by creating additional obstacles to effective regulation.
This new analysis seemingly requires that both the origin
of the "effects" and the "effects" have a direct link to
commerce. The Court's prior decisions do not dictate this
novel origin/source determination requirement which
would unnecessarily cabin the Commerce Clause power. 41
In fact, the Court's decisions state quite clearly that if an
activity "substantially affects" commerce, it may be
regulated by Congress under the Commerce Clause.42 It is
truly questionable whether the very action of growing
wheat, or any food, for purely private consumption has
any direct link to commerce-as the Wickard court
readily admitted.43 The Morrison Court's attempt to
reconcile the affirmation of the Agricultural Adjustment
Act of 1938 with the invalidation of § 13981 of VAWA
does nothing more than compound the already confusing
history of Commerce Clause jurisprudence. 44
In Lopez, the absence of congressional findings was
also a factor in the Court's decision.45 In Morrison,
however, volumes of congressional findings supported the
need for § 13981 of VAWA-findings which stood, in
part, between the majority and their goal of striking down
the statute. The Court cleared away this troublesome
evidence showing the link between gender-based violence
and interstate commerce by simply declaring that the
findings supported an argument that had been "rejected as
unworkable. ' 46
Thus, the majority found, the
Congressional findings were inapplicable.
B.

COMMERCE CLAUSE ANALYSIS OF LLEEA UNDER
MORRISON

For the purposes of LLEEA, Congress has
considered evidence and testimony that acts of violence
based on disability, sexual orientation, and gender

substantially affect interstate commerce.47 Although this
would clearly meet the requirements established by earlier
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, as discussed above, it
could now prove insufficient. Putting aside one's own
view of the merits of the majority's rejection of the use of
the Commerce Clause in Morrison, the current direction
of this tug-of-war between opposing views of the
constitutional use of Congress' authority is no more likely
to be permanent than was a much-different majority's
direction fifteen years ago.48
C.

THE JURISDICTIONAL ELEMENTS IN LLEEA:
ESTABLISHING THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE

NEXUS
The Morrison Court prohibited congressional
regulation of "noneconomic, violent criminal conduct
based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect on
interstate commerce. 49
The strongest case for the
constitutionality of federal criminal statutes-at least
those based on the Commerce Clause-would seem to be
those statutes that require proof of a connection between
the criminal conduct and interstate or foreign commerce.
Such a requirement has been utilized in many federal
criminal statutes.5 In fact, the Supreme Court based its
rulings in Lopez51 and Morrison52 to a great degree on the
lack of a jurisdictional element in GFSZA and § 13981 of
VAWA, respectively. The Morrison majority also made
passing reference to another provision of VAWA, 18
U.S.C. § 2261(a)(t) 53 (which was not at issue in Morrison
because Brzonkala sought relief under the statute's civil
remedy), noting that this provision had been "uniformly
upheld [by the Courts of Appeals] as an appropriate
exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause authority,
reasoning that the provision properly falls within the first
of Lopez's categories 54 as it regulates the use of channels
of interstate commerce-i.e., the use of the interstate
transportation routes through which persons and goods
move." 55 LLEEA, by employing jurisdictional elements,
clearly requires more than a simple showing of the
conduct's aggregate effect on interstate commerce. The
Act requires the government to allege and prove, beyond a
reasonable doubt, a connection between the bias crime
committed because of the victim's gender, disability, or
sexual orientation and interstate or foreign commerce.
This would satisfy the high court's developing standard of
Commerce Clause scrutiny.
We will address each of LLEEA's jurisdictional
elements below-crossing state lines; using a channel,
facility, or instrumentality of commerce; using a weapon
that has traveled in commerce; interfering with
commercial or other economic activity; or otherwise
affecting interstate or foreign commerce-as they appear
in the legislation.
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1.

Crossing State Lines
The first of LLEEA's jurisdictional elements is
similar to the criminal provision in VAWA, not at issue in
Morrison, that requires travel across state lines in the
commission of a crime. This LLEEA jurisdictional
provision requires the government to prove a defendant or
victim crossed a state line or national border, bringing it
clearly within Congress' Commerce Clause power to
"regulate the use of the channels of interstate
persons or
commerce, ' 56 and to "regulate
57 and protect
things in interstate commerce.,
Some might suggest that the congressional sponsors
of this legislation restrict the jurisdictional element to this
provision alone. However, the Justice Department's
experience with even broader language in the Church
Arson Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 247, demonstrates that
such a restrictive cabining of Congress' Commerce Clause
authority would limit the ability of federal prosecutors to
investigate and prosecute bias crimes under the statute
and, as a result, would provide no service to victims of
hate violence based on gender, disability, or sexual
orientation. 8
Using a Channe4 Facility, or Instrumentality of
Interstateor ForeignCommerce
This jurisdictional provision, requiring the use of a
"channel, facility, or instrumentality of interstate or
foreign commerce," 59 is also clearly within Congress'
Commerce Clause authority to "regulate the use of the
channels of interstate commerce" and "to regulate and
60
protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce."
This particular jurisdictional element exists in various
statutes in the federal criminal code.61 While these
statutes have not been tested in the Supreme Court, it is
likely that they would pass the Court's Commerce Clause
62
scrutiny.
2.

Use of a Weapon That Has Traveled in Interstate
or Foreign Commerce
The movement of weapons across state lines or
national borders is a clear example of the kind of
connection to interstate or foreign commerce that lies well
reach of Congress' Commerce Clause
within the
63
authority.
3.

Interference With Commercial or Other Economic
Activity
This provision requires that the criminal conduct
"interfere with commercial or other economic activity in
which the victim is engaged." 64 In 1994, for example,
Congress assured freedom of access to reproductive
services by passing the Freedom of Access to Clinic
Entrances Act (FACE). 65 The Act made it a federal crime
4.
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to use force or the threat of force to intentionally injure,
intimidate, or interfere with any person "because that
person is or has been . . . obtaining or providing
,,66
While the statute
reproductive health services.
arguably may not relate to interstate commerce on its face,
numerous federal courts have found it to be a valid
exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause power, including
seven circuit courts of appeals that have ruled since the
Supreme Court's decision in Lopez.67 The Fourth
Circuit-the same Circuit that invalidated VAWA's civil
remedy-upheld FACE against a Commerce Clause
challenge, reasoning as follows:
FACE does not regulate the provision of
reproductive health care. Rather, it regulates the
use of force, threat of force, or physical
obstruction to intentionally injure, intimidate, or
interfere with persons because they are or have
been obtaining or providing reproductive health
care services. Although this regulated activity is
not itself commercial or economic in nature, it is
closely connected with, and has a direct and
profound effect on, the interstate commercial
market in reproductive health care services.68
For a successful prosecution using this jurisdictional
element, federal prosecutors must provide evidence of
some connection between the act of bias-motivated
violence and the victim's commercial or economic
activity. The Hobbs Act, 69 which prohibits interference
with interstate commerce by robbery, has a similar
jurisdictional requirement and has been upheld by the
70
Tenth and Seventh Circuits. In United States v. Nguyen,
the Tenth Circuit affirmed a federal conviction under the
Act concluding that evidence showing that the restaurant
jointly owned by the deceased victim and her husband
"failed as a result of the robbery because [the husband]
could not run the restaurant himself, attract customers, or
generate revenue" was sufficient to "demonstrate[] the
requisite effect on interstate commerce."71 In United
States v. Thomas, 72 the Seventh Circuit affirmed another
conviction involving the theft of $675 that federal drug
enforcement agents had supplied to the robbery victim, a
confidential informant. In concluding that the defendants
had obstructed interstate commerce in violation of the
Act, Judge Richard Posner noted that the evidence showed
the victim intended to buy cocaine, the cocaine would
have originated in South America, and the cocaine would
have traveled via interstate commerce. 73 The amount of
cocaine in question was irrelevant to the decision. Judge
Posner also noted that "the cases involving prosecutions
that hinge on proving an effect on interstate commerce
hold that that the relevant issue is the effect on commerce
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of the entire class of transactions to which the transaction
or transactions at issue in the particular case belong. 74
5.

Otherwise Affects Interstateor Foreign Commerce
Congress has frequently used the wording "affects
interstate or foreign commerce" to invoke its authority
under the Commerce Clause.75 This jurisdictional element
appears in a number of federal statutes, including criminal
provisions that prohibit violent conduct or conduct that
facilitates violence.7 6
The reach of the "affects
commerce" jurisdictional element is not unlimited,
however, and requires a case-by-case analysis. Indeed,
there may be some cases where the assertion that the
activity allegedly "affect[s] commerce" will be
questionable. 17 Nonetheless, this jurisdictional element is
well within the Commerce Clause power. 78
LLEEA's multiple jurisdictional elements ensure
that the legislation allows Congress to address the national
problem of hate-motivated crimes while still fitting into
the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence, as well as
the Court's increasingly
conservative view of
congressional authority. Until the Supreme Court
significantly narrows the use of Congress' Commerce
Clause authority, the legal ground supporting the
constitutional authority for federal criminal legislation
stands firm.
IV. CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY UNDER THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
After the Civil War, the federal government
recognized civil rights essential to national citizenship,
and sought to protect and enforce those rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 79 The Civil Rights Act of 1866
set forth the rights all citizens possess regardless of race,
including the ability to bring private lawsuits, make
private contracts, and benefit from all laws regarding
"security of person and property." 80 Congress then
protected those rights through criminal sanction. For
example, a defendant could spend up to ten years in prison
if convicted of "conspir[ing] to injure, oppress, threaten,
or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment
of any right or privilege secured to him by the constitution
or laws of the United States," or for traveling with at least
one other person "in disguise on the highway, or on the
premises of another, with intent to prevent or hinder his
free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege so
secured." 81
In response to a challenge of the constitutionality of
this statute, the Supreme Court affirmed Congress' power
to protect civil rights through criminal statutes. In The Ku
Klux Klan Cases, several people were convicted and
imprisoned for conspiring to intimidate "a citizen of
African descent, in the exercise of his right to vote for a

member of the congress of the United States, and in the
execution of that conspiracy they beat, bruised, wounded,
and otherwise maltreated him." 82 They had plainly acted
"on account of [the victim's] race, color, and previous
condition of servitude." 83 Defendants charged that the
Civil Rights Act represented an unconstitutional
encroachment by the federal government into an area of
criminal law expressly reserved to the states. The
Supreme Court rejected the notion that "when a question
of the power of congress arises the advocate of the power
must be able to place his finger on words which expressly
grant it."' 84 Instead, upholding Congress' authority to
impose criminal sanctions against the defendants, the
Supreme Court warned that:
[I]f the government of the United States has
within its constitutional domain no authority
to provide against these evils . . . then,
indeed, is the country in danger, and its best
powers, its highest purposes, the hopes which
it inspires, and the love which enshrines it,
are at the mercy of the combinations of those
who respect no right but brute force, on the
one hand,85and unprincipled corruptionists on
the other.
The Supreme Court reaffirmed these principles in
Screws v. United States,86 a 1945 case that arose when law
enforcement officers arrested a black man for stealing a
tire and then beat him to death. The federal indictment
charged the officers with depriving the man of "'rights,
privileges, or immunities secured or protected' to him by
the Fourteenth Amendment-the right not to be deprived
of life without due process of law; [and] the right to be
tried, upon the charge on which he was arrested, by due
process of law. 87 Rejecting an argument that the charge
was unconstitutionally vague, the Supreme Court held that
Congress was constitutionally authorized to protect,
through criminal sanction, any "right which has been
made specific either by the express terms of the
Constitution or by decisions interpreting them." 88 The
Supreme Court recognized that Congress could create and
expand federal criminal civil rights laws to protect rights
that were not specifically enumerated in the Constitution.
The Supreme Court again recognized the federal
government's authority to protect civil rights through
criminal sanction in 1966, when it decided two landmark
cases. The first, United States v. Price, arose from the
murder of civil rights workers Michael Schwerner, James
Chaney, and Andrew Goodman, and the second, United
States v. Guest, arose from the murder of educator Lemuel
Penn. In Price and Guest, the Court ruled that Fourteenth
Amendment due process and equal protection rights were
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legitimate bases for 18 U.S.C. § 241, a federal criminal
statute against conspiracy to "injure, oppress, threaten, or
intimidate [any person] in the free exercise or enjoyment"
of any constitutional or legal right.8 9 The opinions
suggested, however, that § 241 may not have covered the
discriminatory acts of private individuals.
In response to this and other limitations in existing
federal statutes, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of
1968.90 A section of the Act, which became 18 U.S.C. §
245,91 imposed criminal sanctions on private individuals
for knowingly interfering with a person because of his
race, color, religion, or national origin or because he was
participating in federally protected activities.
Such
activities included interstate travel, voting in federal
elections, attending public schools, or using state
facilities. The Senate report accompanying the bill
acknowledged that law enforcement is usually an area of
local concern, but in the face of unwillingness by local
officials to prosecute crimes of racial violence, there is
"need for Federal action to compensate for the lack of
effective protection and prosecution on the local level." 92
When a citizen is prevented from exercising a federal
right on the basis of racial animosity, the report noted that
"it is not only the individual Negro and the peace and
dignity of the State that is injured. Such lawless acts are
distinctly Federal crimes and it is, therefore, appropriate
that responsibility for vindication of the rights
infringed
93
should be committed to the Federal courts."
The certainty of the appropriate limits to Congress'
authority to enact legislation under the Fourteenth
Amendment was thrown into doubt by the Court's
decision in a 1997 case, City of Boerne v. Flores.94 In
City of Boerne, the Court invalidated provisions of the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),95 holding
that Congress had exceeded its authority under the
Fourteenth Amendment in enacting certain provisions of
the statute which allowed individuals to challenge neutral
state or local laws of general applicability on the grounds
that such laws violated an individual's free exercise of
religious rights under the First Amendment. 96 The case
arose from a dispute between the Archbishop of San
Antonio and city authorities in Boeme, Texas after the
authorities denied his application for a building permit to
enlarge a local church. The Archbishop challenged the
denial of the building permit in federal district court,
arguing that RFRA allowed the church to challenge the
city of Boerne's building permit decision. However, the
district court concluded that Congress' enactment of
RFRA was an unconstitutional exercise of its authority
under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment. 97 The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed and reversed,
finding the statute constitutional.
The Supreme Court,
however, agreed with the district court and invalidated
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those provisions of RFRA relied upon by the Archbishop
of San Antonio.
The Court's decision in City of Boerne laid the
foundation for the later analysis of VAWA's civil remedy
handed down in Morrison. In City of Boerne, the Court
noted that that section five of the Fourteenth Amendment
grants Congress the authority to enact only "measures that
remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions." 99 The Court
stated:
There
must be a
congruence
and
proportionality between the injury to be
prevented or remedied and the means adopted
to that end. Lacking such a connection,
legislation may become substantive in
operation and effect. History and our case law
support drawing the distinction, one apparent
from the text of the Amendment. l °°
A.

BUILDING ON CITY OF BOERNE
In their analysis, the Morrison majority dismisses the
Fourteenth Amendment arguments in support of VAWA's
civil remedy, relying in part on a narrow interpretation of
"state action" that ignores both the authority for-as well
as the necessity of-congressional action when faced with
state inaction. This, combined with the RFRA decision,
may challenge Congress' authority to enact legislation
under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Morrison majority made much of the "timehonored principle" that the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits only state action. What the majority failed to
also acknowledge, however, is that state inactionis a form
of "state action." As Justice Breyer's dissent pointed out:
The Federal Government's argument... is that
Congress used § 5 to remedy the actions of
state actors, namely, those States which,
through discriminatory
design or the
discriminatory conduct of their officials, failed
to provide adequate (or any) state remedies for
women
injured
by
gender-motivated
violence-a failure that the States, and
Congress, documented in depth 0l l
Justice Breyer further noted that the cases relied
upon by the majority, United States v. Harris0 2 and The
Civil Rights Cases,10 3 did not address state inaction and
therefore cannot stand for the proposition that remedying
state inaction to protect the civil rights of individuals lies
beyond the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment. In both
of these cases, in fact, the statutes in question neither
"[referred] to the laws of the State or their administration
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by her officers"1I nor "profess[ed] to be corrective of any

constitutional wrong committed by the States. ' 05 In fact,
in correspondence with Circuit Judge Woods, Justice
Bradley, the author of the Court's opinion in The Civil
Rights Cases, concluded: "Denying includes inaction as
well as action. And denying the equal protection of the
laws includes the omission to protect, as well as the
omission to pass laws for protection."'' 0 6 This exchange of
letters clearly influenced Judge Woods, who wrote in
United States v. Hall'°7 that the Fourteenth Amendment
provides authority for Congress to legislate
to protect the fundamental rights of citizens of
the United States against unfriendly or
insufficient state legislation, for the fourteenth
amendment not only prohibits the making or
enforcing of laws which shall abridge the
privileges of the citizen, but prohibits the states
from denying to all persons within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Denying includes inaction as well as action,
and denying the equal protection of the laws
includes the omission to protect, as well as the
omission to pass laws for protection. 0 8

B.

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS OF
UNDER MORRISON

LLEEA

For purposes of LLEEA, having the Fourteenth
Amendment provide authority for federal involvement in
instances of state inaction, or failure to enforce laws
already in place, is key. The congressional debates over
the reach of Fourteenth Amendment indicate a consensus
of opinion that any state "systematically" refusing to
provide legal protection to a particular group would
violate the amendment's Equal Protection guarantee. 1°9
That is not to say that a private action can be transformed
into state action by a simple declaration." 0 Neither can a
state's inaction or abdication of duty be absolved simply
because it is, in essence, a non-occurrence. l
Justice Breyer also deftly refuted the majority's
assertion that § 13981 of VAWA lacks '"congruence and
proportionality' to the state discrimination that it purports
to remedy"' "l 2 because it "is not 'directed ... at any State
or state actor""' 3 by noting that Congress had received
voluminous testimony over a four-year period on the
"pervasive gender-based stereotypes hampering many
state legal systems,' 14 including "the task force reports of
at least twenty-one States documenting constitutional
violations."' 15
In the case of LLEEA, Congress has heard from
constitutional scholars, state and local law enforcement
officials, U.S. Department of Justice officials, and

individual victims of bias-motivated violence since the
original legislation, the Hate Crimes Prevention Act, was
first drafted and introduced in 1997.1l 6 While this
testimony is clear and convincing of the need for this
legislation, it does not represent evidence from each and
every state of the union. The question remains from
Morrison whether such exhaustive evidence is required to
justify or support remedial congressional action. If such
an extraordinary burden did exist, it would impede any
form of immediate congressional response to a national
Further, such a
crisis or epidemic of violence.
requirement would delay (if not, in fact, prevent)
congressional action by way of legislative remedy.
Thankfully, such evidence is not required. As Justice
Breyer noted, "This Court has not previously held the
in
Congress must document the existence of a problem
'' 17
every State prior to proposing a national solution."
CONCLUSION: CONGRESSIONAL
AUTHORITY TO ENACT LLEEA
Federal criminal sanctions for violations of civil
rights are not new. Since the Civil War, Congress has
have
courts
federal
enacted' ' 8-and
repeatedly
9
upheld" -laws with criminal sanctions designed to
establish national standards for civil rights enforcement.
Like similar federal criminal legislation dating back to the
Civil War, 20 these statutes prohibit conduct that could
also be unlawful and subject to criminal prosecution under
state law. The federal government has historically played
a significant role in the prosecution and punishment of
these civil rights violations. Although criminal law is
traditionally the domain of the states, Congress has
regularly criminalized behavior with broad national
implications, including organized crime, terrorism,
corporate fraud transcending state lines, and the violation
of civil rights. 121 In fact, the federal government has
enacted more than 3,000 criminal statutes22 since 1866,
many of which have concerned civil rights.'
Critics of LLEEA have questioned whether Congress
has the authority to enact such a statute. Such criticism
13
increased sharply after Morrison was handed down. 2
This criticism, however, ignores the reality that the statute
LLEEA is based upon, 18 U.S.C. § 245, has been upheld
as constitutional by both the Eighth and the Tenth Circuit
Additionally, these critics
Courts of Appeals. 24
underestimate the constitutional authority granted to
Congress to enact such statutes. Many of the "civil rights"
statutes enacted by Congress-both criminal and civilhave been based upon two sources of congressional
authority: the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth
Amendment. Recognizing that basic civil rights are
matters of overriding federal interest, Congress
consistently uses its authority under these constitutional
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provisions-either alone or in combination-to enact
legislation aimed at establishing a national standard for
civil rights enforcement.
The Court's decision in
Morrison did nothing to alter the precedential weight that
underlies Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause
and the Fourteenth Amendment to enact this legislation.
LLEEA failed to pass in the 106 th Congress. The
debate and dialogue that accompanied the progression
from the language of HCPA to the strengthened version
that is LLEEA will set the stage for renewed efforts in the
107"h Congress to address the epidemic of hate violence in
America. It is impossible to predict either the chances of
LLEEA becoming law in the 107"' Congress or the next
stage of the Supreme Court's evolving Commerce Clause
and Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. One thing is
clear: the Court's decision in Morrison resonated on
Capital Hill and was taken seriously. Sponsors of LLEEA
responded with an enhanced bill that addresses the Court's
concerns and merits immediate enactment.
NOTES
I

United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000).

2

18 U.S.C. § 2661 (2000).

3

20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000).

Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic and State Univ., 935 F. Supp.
772 (W.D. Va. 1996) (also dismissing Brzonkala's claim against
the educational institution).
4

Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic and State Univ., 169 F.3d 820
(4th Cir. 1999) (en banc).

characteristics of the victim marks a step away from the
recognition that every one of us is a child of G-d (sic),
equal in His eyes, and therefore entitled to the equal
protection of the law. Second, hate crimes legislation
further balkanizes American society along racial and
ethnic lines, building walls instead of bridges. Third, I
am generally opposed to more federal crime legislation,
especially in circumstances where, as here, the data
shows that the states are enforcing the law. Finally, hate
crimes legislation punishes thought in a manner at odds
with the First Amendment.
Hate Crimes Violence: Hearing on H.R. 1082 Before the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 30 (1999) [hereinafter
House HCPA Hearing] (testimony of Daniel E. Troy, Associate
Scholar of Legal Studies, American Enterprise for Public
Policy).
See, e.g., Deadbeat Parents Punishment Act of 1998, Pub. L.
No. 105-187, 112 Stat. 618 (creating federal felony of willful
failure to pay legal child support obligations); Drug-Induced
Rape Prevention and Punishment Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104305, 110 Stat. 3807 (criminalizing distribution of controlled
substances without the victim's knowledge in the commission of
a crime of violence, including rape); Sex Crimes Against
Children Prevention Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-71, 109 Stat.
774 (increasing penalties for conduct involving the sexual
exploitation of children); Church Arson Prevention Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-155, 110 Stat. 1392 (clarifying federal
jurisdiction over crimes relating to damage of religious
property).

See, e.g., CombatingHate Crimes: Promoting a Responsive
and Responsible Role for the Federal Government: Hearing on
S. 622 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong.
38 (1999) [hereinafter Senate HCPA Hearing] (testimony of
Robert H. Knight, Senior Director for Cultural Studies, Family
Research Council: "[The legislation] sets up special classes of
victims . . . politicize[s] criminal prosecutions . . . add[s]
nothing to the prosecution of real crimes of violence.. . vastly
expand[s] the power and jurisdiction of the federal government.
. [and] would have a chilling effect on free speech. ..
HCPA encountered similar opposition in the House hearings:

See also Telemarketing Fraud Prevention Act of 1998, Pub.
L. No. 105-184, 112 Stat. 520; Digital Millennium Copyright
Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (enacting
criminal penalties for circumventing technology designed to
protect digital copyrights); Protection of Children from Sexual
Predators Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-314, 112 Stat. 2974;
Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998, Pub. L.
No. 105-318, 112 Stat. 3007; Criminal Use of Guns Act, Pub. L.
No. 105-386, 112 Stat. 3469 (1998); Veterans' Cemetery
Protection Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-101, 111 Stat. 2202;
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No.
104-132,
110
Stat.
1214;
Comprehensive
Methamphetamine Control Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-237,
110 Stat. 3099; False Statements Accountability Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-292, 110 Stat. 3459; Economic Espionage Act
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, 110 Stat. 3488.

There are at least four key reasons why I believe that
federal hate crimes legislation or the expansion thereof
is unnecessary and in fact 'ounterproductive. First,
basing the degree of punishment on status or

The generous body of federal law making drug trafficking
and possession a federal offense demonstrates this principle
dramatically. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) ("Except as
authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any

6

Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1759.

7
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person knowingly or intentionally... to manufacture, distribute,
or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or
dispense, a controlled substance."); 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) ("It shall
be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess
a controlled substance unless such substance was obtained
directly, or pursuant to a valid prescription or order, from a
practitioner, while acting in the course of his professional
practice, or except as otherwise authorized by this subchapter or
subchapter II of this chapter.").
LLEEA was an enhanced version of a bill called the Hate
Crimes Prevention Act (HCPA), that was introduced in the
House and Senate (H.R. 1082/S. 622) in 1999, early in the 10 6th
Congress. As the 10 6th Congress began to wind down in the
summer of 2000, the main goal of congressional supporters of
the legislation became finding a legislative vehicle that could be
amended with a hate crime bill. Because of a perception that
LLEEA was the stronger of the two pieces of legislation, it was

v. Baird, 85 F.3d 450 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Sowa, 34
F.3d 447 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Piche, 981 F.2d 706
(4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Lane, 883 F.2d 1484 (10th Cir.
1989); United States v. Ebens, 800 F.2d 1422 (6th Cir. 1986);
United States v. Bledsoe, 728 F.2d 1094 (8th Cir. 1984); United
States v. Franklin, 704 F.2d 1183 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 845 (1983); United States v. McDermott, 822 F. Supp.
582, (N.D. Iowa 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 29 F.3d 404
(8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Creekmore, 648 F. Supp. 1369
(N.D. Ala. 1986).

9

LLEEA - not HCPA - that was offered as an amendment to the

Fiscal Year 2000-2001 Department of Defense Authorization
bill in the Senate on June 20, 2000. In addition to LLEEA, the
Senate attached an additional hate crimes measure - offered by
Judiciary Chairman Orrin Hatch - to the Defense Authorization
bill.
The House of Representatives voted, 232-192, to support
the inclusion of LLEEA in the Department of Defense
Authorization bill on September 13, 2000. The vote was on a
non-binding motion instructing the House members of the joint
House-Senate Conference Committee on the Department of
Defense Authorization bill to accept the Senate-passed LLEEA
even though the hate crimes bill had never been voted on in the
House of Representatives.
"

" The amendment passed by a vote of fifty-seven to forty-two
and became part of the Senate's version of the Defense
Authorization bill with support from thirteen Republican
senators. See H.R. 4205, 106th Cong. §§ 1501-10 (2000). This
legislation is also known as the "Kennedy-Smith amendment"
after the amendment's sponsors, Senators Edward Kennedy (DMA) and Gordon Smith (R-OR). The thirteen Republican
senators voting for LLEEA were Conrad Burns (MT), Lincoln
Chafee (RI), Susan Collins (ME), Mike DeWine (OH), Jim
Jeffords (VT), Richard Lugar (IN), Connie Mack (FL), Bill Roth
(DE), Gordon Smith (OR), Olympia Snowe (ME), Arlen Specter
(PA), Ted Stevens (AK), and George Voinovich (OH).
Helen Dewar, GOP Shelves Expansion of Law on Hate
Crimes, WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 2000, at A14.
12

" The

Local Law Enforcement Enhancement Act, an
amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2001, H.R. 4205, 106th Cong. § 1504, 1507 (2000). See
also Violent Crimes Control and Law Enforcment Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2096 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §
994 (2000)).
, This provision applies to hate crimes motivated by the real
or perceived race, color, religion, or national origin of the
victim.
,6 Hate crimes motivated by the religion or national origin of
the victim are prohibited under both provisions of LLEEA.
,7 The jurisdictional element in LLEEA requires a federal
prosecutor to prove a connection between the hate crime and
interstate or foreign commerce in one of the following ways:
(i) [The crime] occurs during the course of, or as the
result of, the travel of the defendant or the victim - (I)
across a State line or national border; or (II) using [sic] a
channel, facility, or instrumentality of interstate or
foreign commerce;
(ii) the defendant uses a channel, facility or
instrumentality of interstate or foreign commerce in
connection with [the crime];
(iii) in connection with [the crime] the defendant
employs a firearm, explosive or incendiary device, or
other weapon that has traveled in interstate or foreign
commerce; or
(iv) [the crime] (I) interferes with commercial or other
economic activity in which the victim is engaged at the
time of [the crime]; or (I) otherwise affects interstate or
foreign commerce.
H.R. 4205, 106th Cong.

'"

§ 1507 (2000).

See United States v. Page, 84 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1996);

United States v. Nelson, 90 F.3d 636 (2d Cir. 1996); United
States v. Dunnaway, 88 F.3d 617 (8th Cir. 1996); United States

is 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000).
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activity is commercial or noncommercial may in some
cases result in legal uncertainty. But, so long as
Congress' authority is limited to those powers
enumerated in the Constitution, and so long as those
enumerated powers are interpreted as having judicially
enforceable outer limits, congressional legislation under
the Commerce Clause always will engender "legal
uncertainty."

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating
the Gun-Free School Zone Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1988 &
Supp. V 1993), as an unconstitutional use of Commerce Clause
authority by Congress).
19

20

City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).

21

See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S.

241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964);
statutes and cases cited infra notes 63, 67, 70, 72, 78.
n

379 U.S. 241 (1964).
379 U.S. 294 (1964).
Heartof Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 243.
McClung, 379 U.S. at 296.
Heartof Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 243.
MeClung, 379 U.S. at 296-97.
Heartof Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 260; McClung, 379 U.S.

at 304.
2

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995).

30

United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993).

31

In considering the lack of such a connection, the court

reasoned that:
Section 922(q) is a criminal statute that by its terms has
nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic
enterprise, however broadly one might define those
terms. Section 922(q) is not an essential part of a larger
regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory
scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity
were regulated. It cannot, therefore, be sustained under
our cases upholding regulations of activities that arise
out of or are connected with a commercial transaction,
which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects
interstate commerce.
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (footnote omitted).
United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1750 (2000);
see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
n

3

The Lopez court vocalized such legal uncertainty:
Admittedly, a determination whether an intrastate
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Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566.
If the aftermath of Lopez gives any guidance, the Court's
decision in Morrison should provide quite a boon to federal
criminal defendants. For example, in the eighteen months
following the Supreme Court's decision, at least fifteen federal
criminal statutes were subject to Lopez challenges in thirty cases
in nineteen federal Appellate and District courts. The Sixth
Circuit examined recent challenges to the Commerce Clause
authority in United States v. Wall and referenced the following
cases:
34

United States v. Chesney, 86 F.3d 564 (6th Cir.
1996)[cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1282 (1997)] (upholding
18 U.S.C. § 922(g), which prohibits the possession of a
firearm by a felon); United States v. Turner,77 F.3d 887
(6th Cir. 1996) (same); United States v. Michael R., 90
F.3d 340, (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding 18 U.S.C. §
922(x)(2), which prohibits juvenile possession of a
handgun); United States v. Staples, 85 F.3d 461 (9th Cir.
1996) (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), which prohibits
the use of a firearm while engaged in drug trafficking);
United States v. Folen, 84 F.3d 1103 (8th Cir. 1996)
(upholding 18 U.S.C. § 842(i), which prohibits felons
from possessing explosives); United States v.
Lomayaoma, 86 F.3d 142 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding the
Indian Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153); United
States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 1995) (upholding
the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, 18
U.S.C. § 248(a)(1)); United States v. Sherlin, 67 F.3d
1208 (6th Cir. 1995) (upholding federal arson statute, 18
U.S.C. § 844(i)), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 795 (1996) and
116 S. Ct. 1548 (1996); United States v. Bolton, 68 F.3d
396 (10th Cir. 1995) (upholding the Hobbs Act, 18
U.S.C. § 1951), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 966 (1996);
United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105 (4th Cir. 1995)
(upholding 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), which prohibits the
manufacture of marijuana); United States v. Bishop, 66
F.3d 569 (3rd Cir. 1995) (upholding carjacking statute
18 U.S.C. § 2119), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 681 (1995)
and 116 S. Ct. 750 (1996), United States v. Wilks, 58
F.3d 1518 (10th Cir. 1995) (upholding a statute that
prohibited the possession or transfer of machine guns, 18
U.S.C. § 922(o)); cf. Pic-A-State Pa., Inc. v. Reno, 76
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F.3d 1294 (3d Cir. 1996) (upholding Interstate Wagering
Amendment, 18 U.S.C. § 1301, which prohibits the
transmission in interstate commerce of information to be
used for the purpose of procuring a lottery ticket), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 2504 (1996) ....
Few courts have
cited Lopez to reverse a conviction. See, e.g., United
States v. Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d 522, 527 (9th Cir.
1995) (holding that receipt of natural gas from out-ofstate source was insufficient to confer federal jurisdiction
for arson conviction); United States v. Mussari, 894 F.
Supp. 1360, 1363-64 (D. Ariz. 1995) (holding that the
Child Support Recovery Act, 18 U.S.C. § 228, which
punished the failure to pay child support, was an
unconstitutional exercise of congressional power)[rev'd
by 95 F.3d 787 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, (520 U.S.
1203) (1997)] ... United States v. Olin Corp., 927 F.
Supp. 1502, 1522-32 (S.D. Ala. 1996) (holding that
Lopez prohibits the application of CERCLA
[Comprehensive
Environmental
Response,
Compensation and Liability Act] liability)[rev'd by 107
F.3d 1506 (1 lth Cir. 1997)].

consume their own wheat circumvented the desired limitation.
The consumption of home-grown wheat, in turn, would undercut
the market demand, drive prices down, and "would have a
substantial effect in defeating and obstructing [Congress'
purpose] to stimulate trade ... at increased prices." 317 U.S. at
129.
Morrison, 120 S.Ct. at 1750 (citing United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995)).
3

Id. at 1767, n.13 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted).
The debate over where such words fall on the continuum
from mere semantics to critical substance is hardly new.

4

"[D]irect" has been contrasted with "indirect," and what
is "remote" or "distant" with what is "close and
substantial."
Whatever terminology is used, the
criterion is necessarily one of degree and must be so
defined. This does not satisfy those who seek for
mathematical or rigid formulas. But such formulas are
not provided by the great concepts of the Constitution
such as "interstate commerce," "due process," [and]
"equal protection."

United States v. Wall, 92 F.3d 1444, 1448 & nn.8-10 (6th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1059 (1997). See also infra notes
41 and 123.
Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1751.
Id. at 1752.
IId. at 1750.
Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). Filburn, an Ohio
farmer, challenged the constitutionality of the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1938 which, in part, regulated the amount of
wheat he could grow on his own farm for his own consumption.
In mounting his Commerce Clause attack on the Act, Filburn
argued that the production and consumption of wheat were
activities beyond the reach of Congress under the Commerce
Clause because they were local in nature and their effects upon
interstate commerce were at most "indirect." The Supreme
Court disagreed. Upholding the statute, the Court noted that:
39

[E]ven if [Filburn's] activity [is] local and though it may
not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its
nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial
economic effect on interstate commerce, and this
irrespective of whether such effect is what might at some
earlier time have been defined as "direct" or "indirect."
317 U.S. at 125. Finding that one of the primary purposes of the
Act was to limit the volume of wheat to increase the market
price, the Court noted that allowing individuals to grow and

Santa Cruz v. Labor Board, 303 U.S. 453, 466-67 (1938). This
was also quoted in Wickard, 317 U.S. at 123, n.24.
92

See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559 ("We conclude, consistent with

the great weight of our case law, that the proper test requires an
analysis of whether the regulated activity 'substantially affects'
interstate commerce."); Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1749
("[Petitioners] seek to sustain § 13981 as a regulation of activity
that substantially affects interstate commerce. Given § 13981's
focus on gender-motivated violence wherever it occurs . . . we
agree that this is the proper inquiry.").
S3 See supra note 38; see also supra text accompanying note
40.
See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1767 (Souter, J.,dissenting).
While the Court's previous Commerce Clause decisions
demonstrate the vitality of the "substantially affects" test, the
history of the Court's interpretation of the Commerce Clause has
experienced wide fluctuations in the degree to which the
"commercial" basis of the activity being regulated was
considered to be "commerce" by the Court. As Justice Souter
pointed out in his dissent in Morrison:
In the half century following the modem activation of
the commerce power with passage of the Interstate
Commerce Act in 1887, this Court has from time to time
created categorical enclaves beyond congressional reach
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by declaring such activities as "mining," "production,"
"manufacturing," and union membership to be outside
the definition of "commerce" and by limiting application
of the effects test to "direct" rather than "indirect"
commercial consequences. See, e.g., United States v. E.
C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 39 . . . (1895) (narrowly
construing the Sherman Antitrust Act in light of the
distinction between "commerce" and "manufacture"); In
re Heff, 197 U.S. 488, 505-506... (1905) (stating that
Congress could not regulate the intrastate sale of liquor);
The Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463, 495-496
... (1908) (invalidating law governing tort liability of
common carriers operating in interstate commerce
because the effects on commerce were indirect); Adair
v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 ... (1908) (holding that
labor union membership fell outside "commerce");
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 . . . (1918)
(invalidating law prohibiting interstate shipment of
goods manufactured with child labor as a regulation of
"manufacture"); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495 . . . (1935) (invalidating
regulation of activities that only "indirectly" affected
commerce); Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R. Co.,
295 U.S. 330... (1935) (invalidating pension law for
railroad workers on the grounds that conditions of
employment were only indirectly linked to commerce);
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 303-304...
(1936) (holding that regulation of unfair labor practices
in mining regulated "production," not "commerce")....
[Today's] revival of a distinction between commercial
and noncommercial conduct is at odds with Wickard,
which repudiated that analysis, and the enquiry into
commerce purpose, first intimated by the Lopez
concurrence... is cousin to the intent-based analysis
employed in Hammer ... but rejected for Commerce
Clause purposes in HeartofAtlanta ... and Darby ....

6

47

Morrison, 120 S.Ct. at 1752.
See generally House HCPA Hearing, supra note 7; Senate

HCPA Hearing,supra note 7.
Compare then-Associate Justice Rehnquist's dissent in
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, ("I do
not think it incumbent on those of us in dissent to spell out
further ... a principle that will, I am confident, in time again
command the support of a majority of this Court."), Garcia v.
San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 580 (1985)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting), with Justice Souter's dissent in
Morrison, ("All of this convinces me that today's ebb of the
commerce power rests on error, and at the same time leads me to
doubt the majority's. view will prove to be enduring law.")
Morrison, 120 S.Ct. at 1773 (Souter, J., dissenting).
49

49

Morrison, 120 S.Ct. at 1754.

50 See statutes and cases cited infra notes 61, 63, 67, 70, 72,
78.
51

Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-62.

52

Morrison, 120 S.Ct. at 1750-51.
This provision states:
A person who travels across a State line or enters or
leaves Indian country with the intent to injure, harass, or
intimidate that person's spouse or intimate partner, and
who, in the course of or as a result of such travel,
intentionally commits a crime of violence and thereby
causes bodily injury to such spouse or intimate partner,
shall be punished as provided in subsection (b).

18 U.S.C. §2261(a)(1) (2000).
Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1767 (Souter, J., dissenting).
In Lopez, the Court identified three categories of activity
that Congress may regulate under its commerce power: the use
of channels of interstate commerce; the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate
commerce; and "those activities having a substantial relation to
interstate commerce . . . i.e., those activities that substantially
affect interstate commerce." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59.
54

The Court explicitly noted the lack of Congressional
findings:
45

We agree with the Government that Congress normally
is not required to make formal findings as to the
substantial burdens that an activity has on interstate
commerce ....
But to the extent that congressional
findings would enable us to evaluate the legislative
judgment that the activity in question substantially
affected interstate commerce, even though no such
substantial effect was visible to the naked eye, they are
lacking here.
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562-63.
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-" Morrison, 120 S.Ct. at 1752, n.5 (citing United States v.
Lankford, 196 F.3d 563, 571-72 (9th Cir. 1999)).
56

Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558.

57

Id.
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As initially passed in 1988, the Church Arson Prevention
Act ("CAPA") authorized federal prosecution only when
defendants, who intentionally defaced, damaged or destroyed
religious property, traveled in interstate commerce or used a
facility or instrumentality of interstate or foreign commerce in
interstate commerce in committing the act. See 18 U.S.C. §
247(b)(1) (1995) (codified as amended by Pub. L. No. 104-155
§ 3(3), 110 Stat. 1392 (1996)). See also H.R. REP. No. 104621, at 4 (1996). The Department of Justice found that "the
highly restrictive and duplicative language of the interstate
commerce requirement . . . made § 247 'nearly impossible to
use."' See id. In fact, despite a dramatic increase in the number
of arsons in churches across the United States between 1988 and
1996, only one case was bought under CAPA, and it had
nothing to with destroying religious property. See id. (citing
United States v. Barlow, 41 F.3d 935 (5th Cir. 1994)).
'8

This LLEEA provision is similar to other constitutionally
upheld federal statutes that prohibit the use or possession of
weapons and other articles that have traveled in interstate or
foreign commerce. Raben notes the following as examples:
63

18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1994 & Supp. 1999) (making it
unlawful for convicted felons to receive any firearm or
ammunition) (upheld in Fraternal Order of Police v.
United States, 173 F.3d 898, 907-08 & n.2 (D.C. Cir.
1998), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 324 (1999)); Gillespie v.
City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693, 704-06 (7th Cir.
1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 934 (2000); United States
v. Bostic, 168 F.3d 718, 723-24 (4th Cir. 1999), cert.
denied, 527 U.S. 1029 (1999);
18 U.S.C. § 842(i) (1994) (making it unlawful for
convicted felons to receive or possess any explosive
"which has been shipped or transported in interstate or

,9 The Local Law Enforcement Enhancement Act, H.R. 4205,
106th Cong. 15 § 1507 (2000).
W

foreign commerce") (upheld in United States v. Folen, 84
F.3d 1103, 1104 (8th Cir. 1996));

Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59.
18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)-(3) (1994 & Supp. 1999)
(responding to Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, making it unlawful
(with certain exceptions) for any individual knowingly to
possess or discharge a firearm "that has moved in or
otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce at a place
that the individual knows.., is a school zone") (upheld in
United States v. Danks, 187 F.3d 643 (8th Cir. 1999) (per
curiam) (table), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 823 (2000));

Memorandum from Robert Raben, Assistant Attorney
General, Office of Legislative Affairs, Department of Justice, to
Sen. Edward Kennedy 5 n.7 (June 13, 2000) (on file with
authors) [hereinafter Raben memorandum]. Raben provides the
following statutes as examples:
6

18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(2) (1994) (prohibiting the transport
in commerce of any firearm, explosive, or incendiary
device, knowing or having reason to know, or
intending, that it will be used unlawfully in furtherance
of a civil disorder);

18 U.S.C. § 2119 (West 2000) (making it unlawful, with
the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm, to engage
in carjacking of motor vehicles that "ha[ve] been
transported, shipped, or received in interstate or foreign
commerce") (upheld in United States v. Cobb, 144 F.3d
319, 320-22 (4th Cir. 1998));

18 U.S.C. § 875 (1994) (prohibiting the transmission in
interstate or foreign commerce of certain categories of
threats and ransom demands);

18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (making it unlawful to
knowingly possess matters containing any visual depiction
that "involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually
explicit conduct" that "has been mailed, or has been
shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce,
or which was produced using materials that have been
mailed or so shipped or transported, by any means
including by computer") (upheld in United States v.
Bausch, 140 F.3d 739, 741 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied,
525 U.S. 1072 (1999); United States v. Robinson, 137
F.3d 652, 655-56 (1st Cir. 1998)).

18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1998) (prohibiting
the willful transportation in interstate or foreign
commerce of a kidnapping victim);
18 U.S.C. § 1462 (1994 & Supp. 11 1996) (prohibiting
the transmission of obscene materials via common
carrier);
18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1994) (prohibiting travel in
interstate or foreign commerce, or the use of "any
facility in interstate or foreign commerce," with the
intent to commit or facilitate certain unlawful
activities). Id.

See Raben memorandum, supra note 61, at 6 nn.9-10.
The Local Law Enforcement Enhancement Act, H.R. 4205,
106th Cong. § 1507 (2000).

"
'2

See supra note 54.
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18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(1) (2000).

6

Id.

6'

See, e.g., United States v. Weslin, 156 F.3d 292 (2d Cir.

and the inferences therefrom demonstrated the requisite
effect on interstate commerce.
Id.

1998); Hoffman v. Hunt, 126 F.3d 575 (4th Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 523 U.S. 1136 (1998); United States v. Bird, 124 F.3d
667 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1006 (1998); Terry
v. Reno, 101 F.3d 1412, 1415-18 (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
520 U.S. 1264 (1997); United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913,
919-21 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1043 (1996); United
States v. Soderna, 82 F.3d 1370 (7th Cir.) cert. denied sub nom.
Hatch v. United States 519 U.S. 1006 (1996); United States v.
Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 680 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 806
(1996); Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1519-21 (11th Cir.
1995); American Life League v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642 (4th Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 809 (1995) (although decided in
February 1995, this case is discussed in light of the Supreme
Court's Lopez decision and cited as controlling authority in
Hoffinan v. Hunt).
6S

Hoffman, 126 F.3d at 587.

'

18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2000).

70

United States v. Nguyen, 155 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir. 1998),

United States v. Thomas, 159 F.3d 296, 297-98 (7th Cir.
1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1023 (1999).

72

" Id.
Id. at 299 (citing Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 15455 (1971); United States v. Staszcuk, 517 F.2d 53, 57-58 (7th
Cir. 1975) (en banc); United States v. Zizzo, 120 F.3d 1338,
1350 (7th Cir. 1997)).
74

Raben memorandum, supra note 61, at 8 (citing Jones v.
United States, 120 S. Ct. 1904 (2000) ("[T]he statutory term
'affecting . . . commerce,' . . . when unqualified, signal[s]
Congress' intent to invoke its full authority under the Commerce
Clause."), and Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S.
265, 273 (1995) ('Th[e] phrase-'affecting commerce'normally signals Congress's intent to exercise its Commerce
Clause powers to the full.")).
75

76

cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1167 (1999).
71

Nguyen, 155 F.3d at 1224.
During trial, the government presented evidence which
showed that the Mandarin Restaurant was a business
engaged in interstate commerce and that its assets were
depleted by the robbery. Mr. Sun [co-owner of the
restaurant] testified that, before the robbery, the restaurant
had often purchased specialty food products from vendors
in California, Missouri, and Oklahoma, and that the
money stolen by Defendant would have been used to
purchase more of those items. He testified that the
restaurant purchased fewer out-of-state items after the
robbery, in part because it closed for twenty-two days and
also because business decreased significantly after it
reopened due to customers' fears about dining at the
restaurant. Mr. Sun also testified that purchases by
customers using out-of-state credit cards declined after the
robbery. According to Mr. Sun's testimony, the business
eventually failed as a result of the robbery because he
could not run the restaurant himself, attract customers, or
generate revenue, and, therefore, he could not purchase
supplies in interstate commerce for the restaurant. An
FBI agent confirmed Mr. Sun's statements, testifying that
credit card sales declined and business revenues decreased
after the robbery. We conclude that the record evidence
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Raben cites the following as examples:
18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1) (1994) (prohibiting the teaching or
demonstration of the use or making of firearms,
explosives, or incendiary devices, or of techniques
capable of causing injury or death, knowing or having a
reason to know or intending that the teaching or
demonstration will be unlawfully employed in, or in
furtherance of, a civil disorder "which may in any way or
degree obstruct, delay, or adversely affect commerce or
the movement of any article or commodity in
commerce");
18 U.S.C. § 247(a)-(b) (West 2000) (prohibiting the
intentional defacement, damaging, or destruction of
religious real property because of the religious character
of that property, and the intentional obstruction by force
or threat of force of any person in the enjoyment of that
person's free exercise of religious beliefs, where "the
offense is in or affects interstate or foreign commerce");
18 U.S.C.A § 2332a(a)(2) (West Supp. 2000)
(prohibiting the use, without lawful authority, of a
weapon of mass destruction, including any biological
agent, toxin, or vector, where the results of such use
"affect interstate or foreign commerce").
Raben memorandum, supra note 61, at 6 n.13.
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See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549, 562, 567 (1995).
See United States v. Green, 350 U.S. 415, 420-21 (1956)
(upholding the constitutionality of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. §
1951(a) (1952) (currently codified as amended by Pub. L. No.
103-322 § 330016(1)(L), 108 Stat. 2147 (1994))-which
prohibits robbery or extortion that "in any way or degree
obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any
article or commodity in commerce"-because "racketeering
affecting interstate commerce [is] within federal legislative
control"). See also United States v. Valenzeno, 123 F.3d 365,
367-68 (6th Cir. 1997) (affirming that Lopez did not affect the
constitutionality of the Hobbs Act); United States v. Robinson,
119 F.3d 1205, 1212-14 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S.
1139 (1998).
78

Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o
State [shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law; nor deny to any person.., the equal
protection of the laws." The Constitution empowers Congress to
enforce this guarantee in section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which states that "[tihe Congress shall have power
to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this
article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5.
'9

§ 1981(a) (1994) (language from original statute
unchanged by later amendment, Pub. L. No. 102-166 § 101, 105
Stat. 1071 (1991)).

interesting exchange between Senator Sam Ervin (D-NC),
Chairman of the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the
Senate Judiciary Comm. and civil rights lawyer Joseph Rauh,
testifying in favor of the legislation. Sen. Ervin, who voted
against both the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see 110 Cong. Rec.
14,511 (1964), and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, see 111
Cong. Rec. 11,751-52 (1965), was adamant in his belief that the
Supreme Court had wrongly decided Heart of Atlanta Motel v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (9-0 decision), and South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (8-1 decision),
upholding both statutes as constitutional. He was equally
adamant that Congress had no authority to enact the Civil Rights
Act of 1968, including what later became 18 U.S.C. § 245.
When Sen. Ervin, a former state Supreme Court Justice, implied
that he was not bound to follow decisions of the U.S. Supreme
Court as a U.S. Senator, he and Rauh engaged in a discussion of
the meaning of the oath of office of a U.S. Senator:
Senator ERVIN: Well, Mr. Rauh, I have taken an oath to uphold
the Constitution, not the mental aberrations of Supreme Court
Justices.
Mr. RAUH: No, I do not think you have, sir. I think you took an
oath to uphold the Constitution as the Supreme Court interprets
it.

80 42 U.S.C.

M The Ku Klux Klan Cases, 110 U.S. 651, 654-55 (1884).
92

Id. at 657.

.1

Id.

8, Id. at 658.
as Id. at 667.
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) (plurality
opinion).
8'

Id. at 93.

"

Id. at 104 (emphasis added).

Senator ERVIN: No, here is the oath I took. I understand you say
this oath does not apply to legislators anyway ....
Mr. RAUH: Of course it does, but it applies to the Constitution as
the Supreme Court interprets it.
Senator ERVIN: Here is the oath I took. I read from Section 3 of
Article VI of the Constitution.
"The Senators and
Representatives before mentioned, and the members of the
several State legislatures, and all executive and judicial offers,
both of the United States and of the several States, shall be
bound by oath or affirmation to support this Constitution." That
is what I took an oath to support, the Constitution, not any
judicial aberrations.
Mr. RAUH: I guess that is the real point of disagreement. I think
that oath means "I support the Constitution as interpreted by the
Supreme Court of the United States," which is the body that the
Constitution sets up as the final arbiter on that document.

United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 797 (1966); United
States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 782 (1966); see also 18 U.S.C.S.
§ 241 (2000)

Senator ERVIN: Can you find in this Constitution anything that
says, "I swear to uphold the Constitution as the Supreme Court
interprets it"?

% See S. REP. No. 90-721, at 5 (1967).

Mr. RAUH: I think that is the interpretation of it.

89

9

This section of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 provoked an

Senator ERVIN: Those are not the words.
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Id. (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 14).

Mr. RAuH: There are no words either way between us, no words
on your side and no words on my side.
106

Senator ERvIN: Mr. Rauh, I read you the words. It says I
support this Constitution. And here is the Constitution.

Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 309-10 & nn.30-31 (1964)

(Goldberg, J., concurrence) (quoting Mr. Justice Bradley).
United States v. Hall, 26 F. Cas. 79 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871)
(No. 15,282).
'1,

Mr. RAUH: And the final arbiter of what those words mean is the
Supreme Court of the United States until it is amended by the
people.
Senator ERvIN: It does not say that anywhere there.
Proposed Civil Rights Act of 1967: Hearings on S. 1026, S.
1318, S. 1359, S. 1362, S. 1462, H.R. 2516, and H.R. 10805
Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong. 292 (1967) (statements of
Sen. Sam Ervin and Mr. Joseph Rauh).

1Id. at 81.
10

See Brief of Laurence H. Tribe, John Hart Ely, Gerald

Gunther, Philip B. Kurland, and Kathleen M. Sullivan as amici
curiae in support of respondents at 12, Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-1039) (citing statements made during
the legislative debates over the Fourteenth Amendment for the
proposition that any "selective refusal to provide legal
protection [to any group] would constitute a 'denial' of equal
protection of the laws."). The brief specifically cites:

S. REP. No. 90-721, at 3.

S

93 Id.

City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).

94

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 to § 2000bb-4 (1994) (currently
codified as amended by Pub. L. No. 106-274 §7, 114 Stat. 806
(2000)).
The Court invalidated only those provisions of the Act that
purported to apply to the laws and actions of state and local
entities. The Court left untouched those RFRA provisions that
provide redress against federal governmental laws or actions
that burden an individual's free exercise rights under the First
Amendment.
96

Flores v. City of Boerne, 877 F. Supp. 355 (W.D. Tex.
1995).
Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir. 1996).

9

City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997).
I Id. at 520.
01

United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1778-79 (2000)

(Breyer, J., dissenting).
1

United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883).

1o3

The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).

Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1779 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(quoting United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 640 (1883)).
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Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3611 (1870)
(statement of Senator Pool) (noting that the Fourteenth
Amendment's command that a state not "deny to any
person.., the equal protection of the laws" included the
obligation not to "deny by acts of omission, by a failure
to prevent its own citizens from depriving by force of
any of their fellow citizens of these rights"); Cong.
Globe, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 334 (1871) (statement of
Representative Hoar) ("[It is an effectual denial by a
state of the equal protection of the laws when any class
of officers charged under the laws with their
administration permanently and as a rule refuse to
extend that protection"); id. at App. 1982 (statement of
Representative Mercur) (explaining that the word
"deny" as used in the Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection Clause "means to refuse, or to persistently
neglect or omit to give that 'equal protection' imposed
upon the state by the Constitution"); id at 501 (statement
of Senator Frelinghuysen) ("A state denies equal
protection whenever it fails to give it. Denying includes
inaction as well as action. A state denies protection as
effectively by not executing as by not making laws.");
Cong. Rec., 43rd Cong, 1st Sess. 412, 414 (1874)
(statement of Representative Lawrence) (noting that the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, which the Fourteenth
Amendment essentially constitutionalized, and the
Enforcement Act and the Ku Klux Klan Act, adopted to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, "[a]ll ...proceed
upon the idea that if a state omits or neglects to secure
the enforcement of equal rights, that it 'denies' the equal
protection of the laws within the meaning of the
fourteenth amendment," for the word 'deny' includes
"an omission by any state to enforce or secure the equal
rights designed to be protected. There are sins of

ANTHONY E. VARONA & KEVIN LAYTON

omission as well as commission. A state which omits to
secure rights denies them.").

jurisdiction ought to be limited to, inter alia, "crime that
involves a matter of overriding Federal interest, such as civil
rights matters.").

Id. at 12 n.6. See also supra text accompanying note 106.
122

11 See Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164-65 (1978)
("[T]he Court's earlier cases 'clearly rejected ... the imposition
of Fourteenth Amendment restraints on private action by the
simple device of characterizing the State's inaction as
'authorization' or 'encouragement."")
"' See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725
(1961) ("But no State may effectively abdicate its
responsibilities by either ignoring them or by merely failing to
discharge them whatever the motive may be. It is of no
consolation to an individual denied the equal protection of the
laws that it was done in good faith.").

FREDERICK M. LAWRENCE, PUNISHING HATE

115 (1999).

M In addition to direct criticism of LLEEA, some national
legal publications are predicting the increased use of a
"Commerce Clause" defense to a multitude of federal laws,
including criminal and environmental statutes, as a result of the
Morrison decision. See Marcia Coyle and Harvey Berkman, A
Court Revolution Brewing?, NAT'L LAW J., June 5, 2000, at Al;
James Dam, New 'Commerce Clause' Defense to Criminal,
Environment Laws, LAW. WKLY. USA, May 29, 2000, at 1;
Tony Mauro, Split Branches, LEGAL TIMES, May 22, 2000, at 1.
'12

See supra note 119.

,,2 United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1779 (2000)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
H,

Id.

114

Id.

H,

Id.

11 See generally House HCPA Hearing, supra note 7; Senate
HCPA Hearing,supra note 7.
"1 Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1779 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
"1 For a review of the legislative history and proposals that led
to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, beginning with
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, see United States v. Lane, 883
F.2d 1484, 1488-93 (10th Cir. 1989).
"I The constitutionality of the existing federal criminal civil
rights statute, 18 U.S.C. § 245, which serves as the model for
LLEEA, has been upheld under the Commerce Clause, the
Thirteenth Amendment, and section five of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Lane, 883 F.2d 1484 (upholding Commerce
Clause authority); United States v. Bledsoe, 728 F.2d 1094 (8th
Cir. 1984) (upholding Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment
authority).
"I See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000).
121

See Federalism and Crime Control: Hearing Before the

Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 106th Cong. 65 (1999)
(Judge Gilbert S. Merritt, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit, testifying in support of the ABA Task Force Report,
Federalization of Criminal Law, said that federal criminal
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